SuperB: An inspiring challenge at the intensity frontier
Is INFN doing enough to ensure adequate staffing for its success?

INFN’s critical contributions to projects like the LHC were made possible by the efforts of its non-permanent workforce. These young (and not so young) researchers, technologists, technicians, and administrative assistants have worked tirelessly to fulfill INFN’s scientific mission, without benefits and without any prospects for more stable employment. They will be no less critical to the successful construction and operation of SuperB. Is INFN doing anything to plan for their future?

Years of Government-imposed hiring freezes have led to a disproportionate reliance across the Italian public sector on temporary labor. At INFN, of a total staff of 2300 people, 500 have “atypical” contracts. Recent doctorates and post-doctoral fellows are watching any hope of a stable career in research evaporate, unless they leave the country to find work elsewhere.

In 2006, a so-called “stabilization” program was introduced as a stopgap. Under its premises, the contracts of fixed-term employees with three years of service were to be made permanent. This would not only have offered stability to a talented generation of young people, many of whom had been repeatedly offered contracts by the INFN on the basis of merit. It would also have freed up funds for the retention and recruitment of a new generation of staff members, since by law, fixed-term contracts are separately budgeted, with tight limits.

So, after a series of delays on the part of the Government in implementing the stabilization program, why has INFN leadership been so slow in “stabilizing” eligible staff members?

As interpreted by other Italian research institutes, the law would allow stabilization-eligible employees to be maintained on fixed-term contracts (in an exception to the normal limits) until permanent positions can be created. So, why have the 60 or so INFN fixed-term employees being stabilized recently received letters (see over) notifying them that their contracts will be terminated in January?

And finally, if the INFN is unable to take advantage of an exceptional chance to permanently hire a generation of young professionals, freeing up funds for temporary personnel, what does that say about INFN’s commitment to maintaining adequate staffing levels to ensure the success of SuperB?

Coordinamento Precari INFN
Coordinating Committee for INFN Temporary Personnel

To the INFN Council of Directors:

We are forwarding the following letter, signed by permanent staff members and associates today, 27 November, in the span of a few hours. Please read it with attention.

Best regards.

To the INFN Council of Directors:

Subject: Extension of contracts for stabilization-eligible employees

Over the course of the last few days, we have come to understand that the INFN is sending letters to stabilization-eligible employees notifying them that their fixed-term contracts will be concluded at the end of 2009. We believe this to be a serious mistake that is the result of an ultra-restrictive interpretation of the relevant regulations, and which above all damages the INFN, as we attempt to explain in this letter. We are appealing to each member of the Council of Directors to carefully consider our arguments, and to work towards the revocation by the INFN of the termination letters already delivered and for the extension of the fixed-term contracts of the stabilization-eligible employees under the terms of the stabilization procedure.

1. Because it will be damaging to the interests of the INFN.

The stabilization-eligible employees have term contracts without end dates—the contracts are valid for the duration of the stabilization procedure. The costs of these contracts does not count against the allocation of the INFN’s operating budget for normal fixed-term contracts, which by law cannot exceed 35% of the 2004 expenditure, or about 2.5 million euros. On the other hand, if the stabilization contracts are terminated, the INFN finds itself having to decide between two bad alternatives: definitively let go of the stabilization-eligible employees, or offer them new fixed-term contracts. In the former case, there would be obvious consequences on the INFN research program, given the level of experience of these employees and their responsibilities within their experiments. In the latter case, the new contracts would count against the spending limits for INFN-funded contracts or soak up the remaining external funding; in any case, they would use up the scarce resources which would otherwise be available for the retention or recruitment of younger employees. From the standpoint of opportunity alone, therefore, it is important to extend the contracts of the eligible employees under the premises of the stabilization procedure.

2. Because it is based on an incorrect understanding of the relevant regulations.

The status of a stabilization-eligible employee is determined by law in accordance with the 2007 budget act, which established well-known criteria for giving permanent contracts to many types of workers, and which also provided for the retention in service of eligible employees up until the end of the stabilization procedure. A March 2008 circular from the Ministry of Public Administration (which by its nature does not have the same force as the law) declared that the stabilization process be considered to end on 31 December 2009. However, the economic emergency measures of this June (a public law in every sense of the word) essentially disregarded the December 2009 date, and recognized the rights of stabilization-eligible employees to up to 40% of new positions opened to public competition during the three-year period 2010-2012. In practice, the stabilization process cannot be considered to have ended, because eligible employees have a collective right to these new positions until the end of 2012. Given this situation, the position of the INFN management—based on the interpretation of a ministerial circular emanated from a lame-duck government and already superseded by law recognizing the status of the stabilization-eligible until end-2012—seems not only incomprehensible, but down right self-injurious. The point is not create new interpretations of the regulations: it is to see them as they are.

3. Because the Council of Directors should take responsibility for extending the contracts of the stabilization-eligible..

We are writing to you because we believe the Council of Directors to be the highest authority of the INFN, since it is the only governing body that can approve official acts. And we believe that, sometimes, the right course is not to adhere blindly to the legal interpretations suggested by bureaucrats, but to try to come to a full understanding of the situation. In the current circumstances, there are institiutes, such as the National Institute of Geophysics and Vulcanology (INGV), that have tried to arrive at this fuller understanding. There are others, such as the Superior Institute of Health (ISS), where such discussion is ongoing. As if that were not enough, permit us to suggest that when the regulations present ambiguities of interpretation, a management structure that has the best interests of the Institute at heart must opt for the most advantageous interpretation possible, even at the cost of assuming the responsibility for that choice, especially in an emergency situation like that at hand.

Finally, we note that an approach of this sort would not solve the problem of temporary labor, but it would have the merit of allowing a larger number of fixed-term workers to continue to work at the INFN, and would give the management the time needed to define an exit strategy and discuss it with the personnel.

Signed:

In the Preamble and Article 6 of your individual contract to establish a relationship as a fixed-term employee, stipulated on 3 December 2007, the duration of said relationship is determined to coincide with the duration of the stabilization procedures established by law as cited in the subject line.

Said procedures, under current regulations, will conclude on 31 December 2009.

Therefore, you are hereby informed that your relationship as a fixed-term employee will be concluded as of 1 January 2010.

The INFN Personnel Department is available for any necessary clarifications.

The President

Prof. Roberto Petronzio

Il buco nero della Ricerca (The Black Hole of Research)

Umberto Guidoni

"We must insist on greater public and private investment in research." With these words, the President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, returned today to the subject of research in Italy. A subject characterized by the stark contrast between the material circumstances in which the research sector is forced to operate, and the rosier proclamations of the Berlusconi Government as well as most media voices, which now speak in unison.

Just as Napolitano was delivering his heartbreaking appeal for more support for research, about one hundred letters of termination were being delivered to fixed-term researchers and technologists  from the National Institute of Nuclear Physics (INFN). INFN President Roberto Petronzio has evidently chosen to hew closely to the burocratic ministerial line rather than to take a stand for the quality of INFN research, which has now been plunged into jeopardy due to the massive exodus of talent that will invariably result.

Yes, because of the paradox inherent in the partisan politics and theatrics of Ministers Gelmini  (Education, Universities, and Research) and Brunetta (Public Administration).  In public they express their indignation over the fact that the universities and public research institutes do not emphasize quality and merit. Behind closed doors, they draw up executive decrees and regulations intended to permanently scrap the public research system, which they consider to be a waste of public resources. And so the indiscriminate cuts to university budgets, the forcible government takeover of the management of the public research institutes, and the laying-off of non-permanent researchers even for insitutes such as the INFN that have a long history of excellence on an international level. This is not a political proposition, but a hostile cultural ideology, which explains, for example, the complete absence of any high-rtanking government represetatives at the inauguration of the LHC in Geneva, the most advanced machine for particle physics ever built, now entering into operation thanks in large part to the significant contributions of Italian scientists.

This hostility towards research is often hidden by rhetorical flourish. Brunetta pontificates about the need for meritocracy and mobility for young researchers.In the abstract, his arguments may be difficult to idly dismiss, but they have very little to do with the actual state of research in this country.

For years, there have been no selection procedures for permanent positions: five years under Minister Moratti, a year and a half under Minister Gelmini, interrupted for a brief spell by the transient Mussi ministry. As a result, there are talented, meritorious young researchers who have never had the opportunity to participate in such a procedure. Whenever there has been no recruitment for many years, the failure to retain temporary staff can give rise to a catastrophe. Brunetta should realize this: he himself became a professor in the "great amnesty" of 1981.

Today, the situation is much more tragic. Decades of spasmodic politics and incautious "reforms" have produced a desolate landscape: between fellowship and scholarship holders and contract and freelance workers, more than 35% of the personnel is non-permanent.

I agree therefore with President Napolitano, but investment in research is only a part, albeit an important part, of the story. The rejuvenation of Italian research must necessarily involve emphasis on the value of the human element, starting from non-permanent researchers, highly qualified professionals who carry out their work in a perennial state of insecurity.

A temporary researcher is a contradiction in terms and a blatant violations of Article 1 of the European Charter of Researchers: The Member States undertake to ensure … a favorable research environment and culture of work, in which individuals researchers and research teams are respected, encouraged, and supported, and benefit from the material and immaterial support needed to accomplish their scientific objectives and carry out their work. In this context, particular emphasis must be places in the working conditions and formative experiences during the initial phases of researchers’ careers, as this contributes to their subsequent choices and reinforces the attractiveness of careers in the R&D sector.

To fight for the application of the Charter of Researchers in its entirety is to give our young a tangible proof of the fact that out country is ready to bet on them.

]]> http://www.buconero.eu/en/2009/11/linfn-in-prima-pagina-su-gli-altri/feed/ http://www.buconero.eu/en/2009/04/riflessioni-di-una-ricercatrice-precaria/ http://www.buconero.eu/en/2009/04/riflessioni-di-una-ricercatrice-precaria/#comments Thu, 02 Apr 2009 21:58:47 +0000 Matthew Moulson http://www.buconero.eu/?p=3328 The following letter was left as a comment to Paolo Valente’s "modest proposal" to permanent researchers to refuse to participate in selection panels for the new R5 competitions. I found this letter particularly compelling, and so I have reproduced it here as an article in its own right, to give it its due visibility.

Hello,

I am a 43-year old researcher without a permanent position. After my PhD (Laurea and Doctorate at LEP), I did a postdoc abroad, again for LEP/LHC, and then switched to astrophysics at CNR to be able to work in Italy, to where I wanted to return for familiy reasons. I now find myself once again at INFN (I actually have a university fellowship, but I work on ATLAS), since the project on which I worked at CNR was not refinanced and depended on the availability of funding from abroad.

I have always served in roles that involved a certain amount of responsibility, and as far as I can tell, I never failed to perform as expected of me. I have always been fully satisfied by my work, except from the standpoint of my chances for professional advancement on Italian contracts. In any case, I never worried about finding myself unemployed; at worst, I feared that maybe I would not be able to do what most interested me (I was probably spurred on by a little presumptuousness).

With respect to the new R5 selections, I have just sent a mail to my current group leader, with Petronzio in CC, in which I explicitly refuse to participate. I listed my reasons, which it seems to me redundant to repeat here.

I don’t know what the majority of non-permanent researchers intend to do–whether or not they intend to passively submit to this inanity out of fear of losing what little they have, or whether there exists the will to react. If at the time of the Industrial Revolution the workers had kept silent as we usually do, we would find ourselves today in their circumstances.

I personally have no desire to and indeed cannot lend support to the Italian tendency to pass the buck, in which the person in charge refuses to accept the responsibility that accompanies his/her position, while at the same time he/she is perfectly able and willing to benefit from the advantages of that position.

As a mother, I refuse to deny time to my family in order to study for an exam in particle physics that I passed 20 years ago, so that I can be judged as worthy or not of a job EXCLUSIVELY on that basis.

This is a hypocritical ruse in which, instead of exposing the short-sightedness of the INFN personnel, the blame gets shifted to the non-permanent researchers, who are eliminated on the pretext that it is EXCLUSIVELY their own fault if they do not obtain a permanent position (the INFN President may try to defend this choice on some other grounds if he can, but he must demonstrate with OBJECTIVE observations that these R5s serve some other purpose, and that he truly thought about it long and hard before bringing them out).

The INFN lives off of our work, since it clearly assumes responsibilities that it is manifestly incapable of fulfulling with its own employees, whether because there are too few of them, or because they refuse to learn C++ and root, or maybe because they themselves are tired of being paid for a fraction of their real working hours and have decided to give a little time back to their families.

Without the non-permanent researchers, the INFN would not be ready for the LHC startup, and here I limit myself to comments on the basis of my own experience.

I know that the problem is the allocation of funds by the State and the lack of a coherent research policy on the part of those who govern us, all colors included, with some a little worse than others.

That is not a good reason for an elite of permanent employees to take advantage of our work so that they can do the things they love. It is not a good reason for which everyone has to be the coordinator of someone else, and whoever is left out will not see their careers advance.

It’s time to do something. We must refuse to be taken for fools. If NO-ONE were to apply to participate in the R5, the INFN would be FORCED to find new and more sensible solutions. We would finally become INTERLOCUTORS instread of mere passive subjects. Let’s take our futures into our own hands–it’s time to stop trusting blindly in local representatives who themselves are part of a power game that in any case DOESN’T INCLUDE US.

Please excuse my vehemence, but it’s time to get some of this out into the open.

Carla Sbarra

The True 21st Century Begins

Conjecture / by Bruno Argento / January 29, 2009

From the fevered mind of Bruce Sterling and his alter-ego, Bruno Argento, a consideration of things ahead.

My city of Turin, Italy spent the year 2008 as the “World Capital of Design.” Our year ended in financial crisis, just the same as everyone else’s.

This doesn’t much bother me, though I am concerned about the distress of others. Here in Europe, we employ terms rarely heard across the Atlantic. Translated into English, these terms are “solidarity” and “precarity.” The year 2009 will be about these issues. Their time has come. Read more

Source: seedmagazine.com

After some words of welcome from Director Calvetti, President Petronzio asked to show the slides shown at the recent meeting of the Council of Directors, considering them to be a good starting point for the discussion (the slides e notes had already been published on our site). The President then followed up by responding in detail to the questions presented by this Coordinating Committee, as well as to some additional questions posed by those present at the meeting. Detailed minutes of the meeting can be found below.

The meeting was an instructive encounter with the President, to whom we renew our expression of gratitude. However, notwithstanding the formal availability of the President to meet and dialogue with us, we feel that the meeting confirmed that the INFN is not transparent in its approach to the dramatic situation faced by a large number of our colleagues who have accumulated on non-permanent contracts over the last eight years, whether because of government hiring freezes or short-sightedness in human resource management by the INFN. Apart from a few vague and formal assurances, we see evidence that confirms a prevalent will to abandon essentially completely an entire generation of workers, with no regard to their merits on the basis of their contributions to the success of INFN’s projects or the achievement of its scientific objectives.

There was one positive note at the end of the day: the LNGS and Naples delegations, principally composed of "cofinanced research fellows" (those of whom, in the words of the President, "are the responsibility of the universities") decided during an afternoon meeting to give life to a working group within the Coordinating Committee dedicated to the situation to those with various forms of fellowships and scholarships who contribute to the activities of the INFN.

Meeting of the INFN President with temporary personnel

Frascati, 1 April 2009

INFN President Roberto Petronzio answered questions posed by the Coordinating Committee for INFN Temporary Workers during the meeting of the INFN Board of Directors of 27 March 2009, and engaged in a debate that touched principally on the questions of the new “R5” qualifying examinations for fixed-term researchers, and on future prospects for research fellows. Following are the minutes of the meeting. For the first part, we reproduce the original questions.

1. Regarding the documentation sent to the Ministry of Public Administration the week of 23 March, we would like to know:

a) Has the INFN finally begun to consider those covered by the stabilization procedures (including those not in service of the INFN, in the famous “third list”) as having a consolidated right to be hired?

A: I am dedicated to protecting the positions of all stabilization candidates on lists one and two, independently of constraints imposed by the government, to wit, the end of the stabilization window on 31 December 2009. After that date, all stabilization candidates will have reserved access to 40% of the positions put to public competition until 2011. Those from list three can obviously compete like the others, and they will have a reserved quota in the public competitions. The waivers that we have requested do not refer to the stabilization procedures, but to the possibility of paying the salaries of stabilization candidates from ordinary funds.

Q (Pino Carinci): And the others?  What can we do about those who have had a position within the INFN but not under a contract as a fixed-term employee [i.e., those in the “third list”—eds.]?

A: Everyone must have the opportunity to participate in competitions in which the winners are chosen on the basis of merit, while the stabilization procedures go in the opposite direction. If there had been no stabilization program, there would have been 100 positions up for competition; instead, the principles of equal opportunity are violated. I can’t make guarantees to everyone; I will answer for those who are in the stabilization lists [only tables 1 and 2—eds.] and not for the others. The only class of people to protect beyond the terms set by the government are the stabilization candidates, i.e., the only ones with a true employment contract with the INFN [again, only those in tables 1 and 2—eds.]. For the others [those in table 3—eds.], it is not possible; we don’t have the funds.

b) Has the INFN taken into account the stabilization candidates for 2008 (those in service on 1 January 2008 and who later complete the requirement of three years in service on the basis of an employment contract stipulated before 28 September 2007)?

c) How many 2008 stabilization candidates are there?

A: In our communication to Brunetta [Minister of Public Administration—eds.], we added to the list of the stabilization candidates those included under the terms of the 2008 budget bill. In total, there are 11 people: 5 researchers, 3 applied researchers, 2 technicians, and 1 administrative assistant.

d) How many workers can be hired by using the unexpired lists of eligible runners-up from past competitions? (ENEA, the National Agency for Alternative Energy and Environmental research, was able to hire a researcher who held a temporary position at INFN on the basis of eligibility from a 2005 competition.)

A: We can’t make use of the eligibility lists because we don’t have positions available: we want to hold new competitions instead of hiring eligible candidates from past competitions. A judgment of eligibility from a competition is not always defendable. Maybe the concept can be more easily applied for administrative positions, but for researchers it is not acceptable to use the eligibility lists.

2. Why haven’t the lists of stabilization candidates been made available to the public, with indications of those who have already been stabilized or for whom a position has been requested? This is fundamental information for those directly involved, who need to be able to evaluate their realistic chances of being hired with sufficient advance to be able to plan.

A: The lists will be made public. Until now, it has not been possible to publish them because competitions for technicians are still ongoing. When the lists of winners and runners-up from these competitions are closed, the definitive lists will be published.

3. How will the priorities for extension or renewal of fixed-term contracts be determined?

A: We don’t yet have an answer to this question. We will try to give some indication of our intentions before the end of April, above all because we will have to suggest alternative career directions before the fixed-term contracts end. The end dates for all expiring fixed-term contracts have been aligned so that the contracts end in July 2009. The problem of establishing lists is worsened by the fact that few directors have given us advice on priorities, putting everyone on the same level, and this makes it objectively difficult. I hope that the solutions that we are working on will allow people to continue to work until new competitions are opened.

4. The “assegno di ricerca,” [research fellowship] which is technically a contract type for personnel in a formative career stage, has been used to pay highly qualified technical/scientific or administrative personnel to serve in roles normally characteristic of INFN employees. What future is in store for these fellows?

A: For the moment, let’s put aside the pathological cases, such as fellows who are 37-38 years old. We will investigate further to determine the extent of that problem. For the rest, the problem is to understand at what point we must make a selection. Making the cut immediately after the doctorate will select one new PhD in five. In fact, I don’t believe that university doctoral programs guarantee a sufficient level of preparation, given that the doctoral thesis is becoming just like the former Laurea thesis. Instead, we must make the cut during or after the fellowship. The only way of getting beyond the current situation is by holding new competitions. Think about the fact that there are about 100 INFN fellows and about 300 more fellows cofinanced by the universities. The INFN cannot be held responsible for the futures of university fellows [and therefore those cofinanced—eds.] There are 600 researchers at the INFN and 3000 at the universities.  Thus the number of researchers working in the area of interest to the INFN is 3600 and the real outlet for fellows is towards university careers: it’s absurd to think that the outlet can be the INFN. If universities create fellowship positions, they must take into account what those fellows will do in the future. It’s not the INFN’s responsibility to solve this problem.

5. What is the INFN’s position with respect to the use of mandatory early retirement (at age 65 or after 40 years of pension contributions) as allowed by L133/08?

A: We are now rigorously enforcing retirement at age 65 [when asked, the President confirms that the limit is actually at year’s end for those turning 65 this year, as this makes no difference in terms of usable resources under current law—eds.] We have not yet made a decision about requiring retirement after 40 years of service. We might reexamine the question, but it would first be necessary to confirm the real dimensions of the phenomenon.

6. Why is it that for the INFN, unlike for other research institutes, there do not seem to be any improvements in the legislative panorama on the horizon? No waivers of hiring limits (in December, at an assembly of personnel representatives, the President seemed all but certain that such a waiver was forthcoming), nor a waiver of limits on the use of ordinary funds for fixed-term contracts, nor prospects for an increase in statutory personnel levels or for more institutional autonomy in budgeting for personnel. Measures such as these were requested at the negotiating table between research institutes and the Ministry of Public Administration last autumn.

A: Some institutes have been able to make use of turnover, which is something that we have not been able to do. The only thing that we can aim for is to obtain an increase in statutory staffing levels, which would allow us to plan more efficiently to absorb personnel.  We feel that it would be much more difficult to obtain a waiver of the limit on the use of ordinary funds for fixed-term contracts [equal to 35% of the amount spent for fixed-term contracts in 2003—eds.].

7. When will the 37 “Mussi” positions be put up for competition?

A: The competitions will open in 2009, and the winners will be hired in 2010.

Additional questions and answers concerning the R5 eligibility selection procedures

Q: How often will the R5 exams be held? Will people who do not pass be eligible to participate in the following session?

A: The logic of the R5 eligibility is simple: fixed-term contracts can be issued on the basis of a selection procedure (Art. 36) or by direct nomination if approved by the Executive Board (Art. 23). In recent years, Art. 23 contracts have been issued on the basis of external funding linked to particular projects, but all fixed-term employee contracts are equivalent once issued. We would like for there to be a system in place for quality control from the very beginning. The only time at which it is feasible to hold an exam on general culture is right after the PhD at the beginning of a research fellowship. The reservoir of fixed-term personnel from which to draw is thus composed of people who are all qualitatively equal; it is no longer arbitrary but it is tied to the number of positions that can be created. Obviously, for this system to work, the selection procedures have to take place regularly. We are thinking that they can be held once per year. The system will be self-limiting: one can participate as many times as one wants, but until one passes, there is no way to have a fixed-term contract. The subjects covered by the exam are known in advance and are all subjects of general preparation. The selection procedure will be a sort of skimming aimed at eliminating the possibility for someone to be given undue preference. Those who have already held a fixed-term INFN contract don’t have to participate.

Q: How many will pass?

A: We can’t quantify that, because doing so would force us to compile an ordered list of runners-up.  And if we do that, then we would be obliged to follow the order of the list in assigning contracts, and that would completely hamstring us [external funding for Art. 23 contracts is almost always linked to a particular experiment or line of research—eds.]. The alternative would be to start fellowships, say, twice per year, but this would tie up the fellowships: someone who finishes their PhD in March would have to wait until October to start their fellowship [fellowships would still be issued without any centralized control—eds.]

Q: It’s quite possible that there could be 500 candidates.

A: If they are all qualified, they will all pass the selection. These guidelines will be given to the selection panels.

Q: Will the eligible candidates from the “concorsone” have to participate in R5 selections?

A: Yes, since the “concorsone” didn’t have an eligibility list.

Q: Why was it decided not to evaluate publication lists and CVs?

A: To avoid selecting people on the basis of that which they have done (or on the basis of the groups and/or experiments on which they have collaborated in the past). The use of an examination as the sole selection criterion puts everyone on the same level.

Further discussion:

Q (Matthew Moulson, Frascati): I share your opinion concerning the importance of having selection procedures in order to aim for excellence. At first glance, the idea of the stabilization procedures seems to contrast with this logic, because it ignores the question of merit. This is difficult to swallow for us researchers as well. However, the INFN seems to be putting too much faith in the traditional instruments used for selection. The INFN assumes that a researcher who has had a fixed-term contract as an employee is necessarily a better researcher than one who has not; instead, everyone knows that in real life the type of contract one ends up with is completely random. The same is true for the competitions: very often, there is more than one excellent candidate, and among those essentially equally excellent, the “winner” is chosen at random. The fact is, many candidates are competing after having a professional history in research of 10 years or more. This observation relates the discussion about the “third list” of stabilization candidates without fixed-term contracts, the refusal to hire researchers using the runner-up and eligibility lists from past competitions, and the new R5 selection procedures. I am absolutely certain that if passing the R5 exam on “general culture” becomes a requirement for those who have never held a fixed-term contract, researchers who have worked for many years on other types of contracts will find themselves at a disadvantage with respect to people who have just finished their PhDs. I appreciate the effort to shore up a situation that is objectively difficult, but these measures need to be given critical consideration. The stabilization window has represented an opportunity for the recovery of a generation of researchers who never had the possibility of participating in a competition.

A: We can’t base the system on the pathological cases. If I want to guarantee the futures of researchers of equal value, I have to hold the R5 selections. The competitions will be nationwide, as will the competitions for the 37 research positions that will open in 2010 [2009 in response to question 7, above—eds.]. The R5 result could be used as an evaluation criterion in future competitions.

Q (Gran Sasso): Holders of fellowships will be crushed in a competition for eligibility that doesn’t take into account professional history in any way. We don’t understand the reasons for instituting the R5s, why not just open competitions directly for fixed-term contracts?

A: Because we do not know a priori what kind of funding will be available. We need to have a list of people ready to draw from whenever external projects provide money and positions.

(Paolo Valente, Roma 1): There is a virtual system and a real-life system. In the real-life system, there are many complicated problems. It is always the weakest who pay the price… [applause]

Q: I am a 41-year old winner of the “concorsone.” It is really necessary to wait for the decision from the Court of Auditors before hiring us? We have heard that other institutes have proceeded with hiring before receiving the formal response from the Court of Auditors.

A: It is necessary to wait for the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers (DPCM). The other institutes got the DPCM before us, and so they could hire earlier. From the standpoint of the interested parties, however, it doesn’t make much difference—by now it is a question of days.

Q: The 78 who will be hired in 2009 fall into two categories: some (41) will be hired in accordance with Art. 5 of the National Collective Labor Contract (CCNL), and the authorizations for these hires must arrive before 30 June; for the others (the stabilization candidates), the authorization to hire them has to arrive before 31 March. Which date counts as the “authorization” date: the approval from the Ministry of Public Administration, that from the Ministry of the Treasury, or that from the Court of Auditors?

A (G. Deleo): The DPCM is what counts [it is unclear which date this refers to—eds.]

Q: Regarding the improper use of research fellowships, our concern is that this crackdown on fixed-term contracts will once again be circumvented by an yet another explosion in the use of alternate contract types, since projects have to be carried out in any case. How do you envision handling this situation?

A: There are about 100 research fellowships issued directly by INFN, and we have tight control over this number. The rest are the result of the policies of the universities. As far as their improper use is concerned, the INFN is trying to reduce the length of the career path. The only truly improper use of the fellowships is to issue them to people who are no longer very young researchers. What must be avoided (and which I will avoid doing) is to give fellowships to people who have already had a fixed-term contract, at least not for research. With respect to semiautonomous collaborator contracts (co.co.co.), there are currently 90, of which 80 are on external, project-linked funds. Normally, I would like to convert the co.co.co.’s into fixed-term employees. Then, there are the VIP contracts…

Q: Don’t you believe that it is improper to use a fellowship, which is supposed to be a formative instrument, to pay someone to do work which would normally be done by a permanent employee?

A: The fellowship is an instrument of collaboration, not of professional formation.

Q: A large part of the research activity is carried out by fellows, for example, at Gran Sasso.

A: The difference between fellowships and contracts is that, to holders of contracts, I have a certain responsibility that I do not have with respect to fellows. From now on, to obtain approval for an experiment, it won’t be enough to obtain funding—it will be necessary for groups to demonstrate that they have the necessary personnel as well. Whoever doesn’t have the necessary personnel won’t get their experiment approved. We will issue a rule enforcing this.

Q: But the real problem is for fellows who find themselves in this situation right now.

A: The universities must resolve this problem. We will give at most four years of fellowships after the PhD. If a university gives someone another four years, that’s their problem. For our part, we will address the problem in the future by refusing to cofinance a fellowship for more than four years total.

Q: So why the R5?

A: If you have a fellowship and a new PhD arrives on the scene and gets hired before you, don’t you feel passed over? Well then, we can use an eligibility criterion that puts everyone on the same starting line, and later, for fixed-term contracts we will evaluate CVs.

Q: Regarding the eligibility, you said that this is a moment when we break with past procedures that were not completely legitimate, and that the R5 will not be punitive, merely selective. But these comments presuppose that there are people working on Art. 23 contracts who are not “worthy” of being fixed-term employees. Who hired them? Who is responsible for choices such as these?

A (Mario Calvetti, who asks to have the floor): When someone requests an Art. 23 there is no comparison with other candidates. The leader of an experiment arrives and asks for a position. The director forwards the request to the Executive Board. However, when you sign an Art. 23 contract, you are signing a contract for a fixed term. This means that renewals are possible only if there is money. Your comments are just demagogy. You need to suggest solutions to these problems. The statutory personnel limit is saturated. The INFN is full. It’s not true that there are people “unworthy” of fixed-term contracts. The fact that there are a finite number of positions means that we have to compare candidates, and then we have candidates who are “worthy” and those who are “more worthy.” In any case, it’s the permanent employees who carry out the experiments. Finally, I would like to add a comment on the people who will be forced into retirement but who don’t have enough years of pension contributions. If lay off these people, they will end up in misery. I would give contracts to these people in order to ensure that they end up with enough years of pension contributions at retirement.

Thousands of researchers and students who have taken to the streets in protest at reforms of Italian universities and public research institutes have won some limited concessions from the government. The protesters had argued that the reforms, which include significant budget cuts, would further weaken a research base that is already short of resources. The Italian government maintains that its reforms are necessary to modernize a university system that is corrupt and inefficient, but has reversed some of the cuts. (continue)

Source: Edwin Cartlidge, Physics World, December 2008

Italian researchers at CERN show their solidarity with a banner that reads, "Italian research? Like this, it is without a future!" (courtesy of Marcella Bona)

In August, strict new budget arrangements were approved by the Italian parliament, in an attempt to pull the country out of an economic crisis which has been slowly unfolding for almost 15 years. Mariastella Gelmini – Minister for Education, Universities and Research – introduced cuts and reforms last month, in order to bring her sector into line with the new budget constraints. continue

Fonte: Atlas e-News

Passed over the summer, Legge 133/08 , the new Italian law, is set to drastically cut the financial and human resources for universities and public research agencies. In particular, Legge 133/08 will reduce the national budget for core expenses such as salaries, building maintenance, and research support in Italian universities by €63.5 million for 2009, a cut that will rise gradually to €455 million by 2013. Altogether, over the next 5 years, such cuts will add up to a loss of almost €1.5 billion in public funding for Italian universities. To get an idea of the scale of the cuts, consider that in 2011 that’s an estimated 12.7% reduction in the core budget the previous government had planned–and the previous government’s budget had already been revised downward to reflect the weakness of the economy. The only possible bright, yet controversial, spot in the new law is that it gives universities the right to become foundations so that they may raise private funds to offset the public losses. continue

Fonte: Science

From: Nature Neuroscience

Source: wsws.org

1. I just want to be clear about the legislation involved. On the Buco Nero homepage you refer to the law L133/08 and DDL 1441-quarter; I think I understand what the L133/08 refers to (reduction of funds/reduction of turn over/possible privatization), but what does the DDL 1441-quarter refer to?

L133/08 was an omnibus package of budget and administrative reforms. The effects were different for public universities and public research institiutes (EPRs). As you noted, universities were hit by 1.5 mld euro in spending cuts between now and 2012 and a 6% per annum reduction thereafter and hiring limits at 20% of turnover replacement, as well as with the prospect of being induced to privatize. For the EPRs, the main effect would have been an immediate 10% cut in personnel. (Employees of EPRs, including researchers, are essentially civil servants in Italy, and the 10% cut was across the board, affecting the entire civil service.) For EPRs, L133 limits new hiring to turnover (up to 100% of positions freed the previous year, subject to the availability of free positions in the EPR’s statutory hiring plan). However, consider the case at the INFN. Our statutory hiring plan calls for 1909 employees in various profiles. There are about 1880 on the permanent staff at the moment. A 10% reduction would have brought the ceiling down to 1740, meaning that we would have had an excess of 140 people. It would have been impossibile to make any new permanent hires until this excess could have been shed by attrition (retirement) at the rate to 30-40/year. In a lesser known provision, L133/08 fixed the limit on money that can be spent for fixed-term contracts at EPRs to 35% of the amount spent in 2003. All of the above was in L133/08. Note I am using the conditional past in some places because recently, a law-by-decree reversing some of these provisions has been emitted by the government (DL180, DL = decreto legge). This becomes law if approved by Parliament within 60 days. DL180 undoes some of the damage of L133 as follows: Universities that spend less than a certain fraction of their funding on personnel are now allowed to hire at a level corresponding to 50% of turnover (instead of 20%) calculated on the basis of cost (instead of heads). Universities spending more than the threshold amount are forbidden from hiring, or from initiating selection procedures. EPRs are exempted from the 10% personnel cut. The funding cuts to universities and the spending limits for fixed-term personnel at EPRs remain. I will explain below how the situation changes in light of DL180. DDL1441-quater (note, Latin for "part four", not quarter) was a provision in a separate bill (L = legge, law; DDL = disegno di legge, proposed law) that in its initial formulation would have abruptly ended the "stabilization" program implemented under the Prodi government. The idea is as follows: In 2002 (during the previous Berlusconi administration) civil service hiring (therefore, including EPRs) was essentially frozen. Apart from occasional exceptions, it has been frozen ever since. In all sectors of the civil service, extensive use has been made of fixed-term and freelance contracts to cover the personnel shortfall. The Prodi stabilization program tried to remedy this situation as follows: Temporary public-sector employees (i.e., on fixed-term but not freelance contracts) who had worked for three years and passed civil service selection procedures could receive permanent contracts. In the event that no permanent contract was available, a temporary employee qualified for stabilization would have their temporary contract indefinitely renewed until they could be permanently hired. As I mentioned before, all of this applies to the civil service in general. Researchers at EPRs were in general affected by the hiring freeze, and a certain number would have been able to take advantage of the stabilization program (the academic selection procedures used to select researchers at EPRs take the place of normal civil service selection procedures in other sectors). Again, it is important to note: the stabilization program was an attempt to accelerate hiring of people who had been identified in selection procedures as potential hires in any case, as a way of clearing the backlog. Here it becomes hard to keep track of the numbers. In any event, at the INFN, there were as many as 250 stabilization-qualified employees, of which 80 researchers. Something like 120 will have been hired by the end of the year, of which 41 of the researchers (9 have gotten fed up and left in the meantime!) The confusion about the numbers is due to issues such as the following:

1. There has been confusion about qualifying contract types, and how many researchers qualify for stabilization.

2. Different EPRs pursued stabilization hiring with greatly different levels of enthusiasm.

3. The Prodi government, after passing the stabilization program, basically threw sand into the works.

In April 2008 the government fell; one of its last measures was an executive order to end the stabilization program by 2009. The idea is that if a "stabilization-qualified" researcher were not to be hired by 2009, they could be let go (i.e., their contract would not be extended until they could be hired.) The initial effect of DDL1441-quater was to move forward the end date for the stabilization program from end 2009 to the date of entrance-in-effect of DDL1441. Essentially, the law would have abolished the stabilzation procedure entirely. In fact, we have heard of at least one EPR that tried to fire people already hired on permanent contracts under the terms of the stablization program. In this original formulation, DDL1441-quater would have forced the INFN to let go within 90 days all of the stabilization-qualified employees not yet hired (perhaps 120 to 170, depending on the exact deadline and method of counting). At best, these people could have been rehired under some other contract type, money permitting and at the cost of letting go some other fellow, fixed-term employee, or freelance. "Money permitting" is a serious qualifier, however, because of the spending limits on fixed-term contracts in L133. (See my answer to point #2, below.) However, DDL1441-quater was almost immediately modified to establish the end date of the stablization program at 30 June 2009. So the net effect in the end was only to move forward the end of the program by six months. Allow me to be clear: that does do some damage, which is not easy to quantify. But for us, the real problem is and always has been L133/08 (apart from in the very first days when DDL1441-quater’s effects seemed immediate, which would have caused more immediate difficulties).

2. Could you please explain how these two laws put at risk the careers of the 600 researchers and technicians from the INFN that you refer to?

The INFN has 600 temporary workers of various types, of which about 300 researchers. Note that technically, there should be NO temporary contracts for administrators and technicians, as they do not have academic career paths. Many of our technicians, in particular, are highly technically qualified and central to our ability to do research. Our estimates of how many reasearchers should be in fellowships or fixed-term contracts as part of a normal academic career is about 160, equal to about 1/5 of the 800 researchers on the permanent staff. The other 140, plus all 300 technical and administrative staff, are on temporary contracts because of the hiring freezes. Of these 600, about 275 are on fixed-term contracts and about 325 are fellows or on freelance contracts. The 275 on fixed-term contracts include the stabilization-qualified workers not yet hired. Suppose the 10% personnel cut were still in effect. The INFN has to reduce its personnel from 1880 to 1740. Assume this is to be done via attrition. Then no-one can be hired until 140 have left. Since people leave at the rate of 30-40/year, this means a minimum of three years before we can have a selection procedure for a permanent position. Keep in mind, hiring has been frozen since 2002. Many of the 600 temporary workers present have their contracts expiring. Fellowships have a maximum of four years. The best temporary contracts for researchers have a cumulative maximum of five years. All in all, it is difficult to keep a researcher on temporary contracts for more than five years, for legal reasons. Then there is the question of money. L133/08 limits spending on fixed-term contracts to 35% of the 2003 value. For the INFN, that is 2.6 million euros. INFN also has some funds from external sources that can be used for fixed-term contacts, for a total of about 7.5 million euros, or 180-185 positions. Of the 275 fixed-term employees, then, about 100 of the personnel on fixed-term contracts are let go immediately, while the remaining are maintained on fixed contracts to the extent possible, until they might be able to be eligible to participate in a selection for permanent hire four years from now, if their contracts can be renewed for that long. For the 325 fellows/freelance workers, there really is nothing to be done. The fellowships expire after four years. A small number of fixed-term contracts freed up by attrition may be the only thing we can offer. Note that new students will finish their PhDs and occupy the freed-up fellowship positions and we have to be able to accomodate them as well, at the rate of perhaps 20 per year. So, the bottom line is that 425 of the 600 are let go over the next three or four years, before we can hope to start hiring again. Now suppose DL180 is finalized and the 10% cut goes away. We can hire at the rate of 30-40 per year in the coming years. We still only have 180 fixed-term contracts available because of the spending limits in L133/08. Suppose we can hire 30 people in 2009. Then we can "handle" 210 of the 275 fixed-term employees—the shortfall is 60 positions, instead of 100, as previously. The problem of the bleak future for fellows and freelance workers remains, as well. Of course, 30 new positions open up in 2010 again, so the problem of the fixed-term workers is easier to deal with (it is easier to string someone out for one year than it is for four), and the possibilities for fellows, etc. are somewhat better. So, even with the positive effects of DL180, we are not out of the woods. The cumulative problem from 6 years of hiring freezes remains. It is worth noting that in 2006 the INFN negotiated with the Prodi Ministry of Universities and Research an expansion of its personnel limit to 2070 (up from the current 1909). This reverted to 1909 when the Prodi government fell.

3. Could you give me some idea of how bad this situation could be for the Italian presence at CERN. Could it threaten the project as a whole?

Here you may be interested in the article "Italy and the LHC" on out web site:

http://www.buconero.eu/en/2008/10/litalia-e-il-progetto-lhc

and click on the British flag—you should get the English version. About 25-30% of the Italian contingent at the LHC is people on fellowships or temporary contracts. If DL180 is not converted into law, the worst case scenario, then these people are at serious risk. Most (2/3? 3/4?) will lose their jobs. Since many have significant hands-on experience with LHC detector hardware, one might hope that they get recruited elsewhere in Europe and that they find new positions in other countries. Clearly, as is the case in any academic environment, the component at risk is predominantly young people who are dedicating their lives to their work. These are the most energetic and productive LHC collaborators, with the most specific knowledge of the hardware and analysis tools. In short, the Italian presence would be devastated, both numerically and in terms of its scientific impact, though many of the individuals might find LHC-related jobs in other countries. Correspondingly, the Italian investment in LHC, about 1 mld euros, will have been rendered completely in vain, as the generation of people who would have brought home the fruits of the know-how gained just won’t be around anymore. Could it cause the project to fail? That depends on how many of the Italian positions lost are regained by the same people when other countries hire to make up the loss. As an example, Italy is about 13% of the ATLAS collaboration, and of that 13%, the most productive 3% (absolute) would be lost. Even assuming that these individuals are not rehired by ATLAS, it is clear that ATLAS as a whole will not fail. However:

- There will certainly be delays, some significant, when people with specific knowledge cannot be consulted to deal with problems that emerge.

- Some future upgrades may not happen, because people with specific technical knowlegde concentrated at certain Italian institutes are no longer present to provide the technical background for the upgrade plans.

- Certain analyses (i.e., studies of physical processes) may not be done, because the people who were doing them left.

In short, the effects on the whole project will be more subtle. But it is clear that when you send away hundreds of people (from universities and INFN together) who have worked on the project for many years, you are diminishing the experience base and therefore the potential for the project to fulfill its highest goals.

4. You talk about a 10% reduction in personnel to be introduced by L133/08. How does this relate to the reduced turn over of 1 in 5?

The 10% reduction is for EPRs. The 20% turnover restriction is for Universities. This is all described above.

5. Could you tell me when these laws will take effect?

L133/08 is already in effect. DDL1441 will be effective when it is approved (it is currently being discussed in the Senate). DL180 is in effect for 60 days; it must be converted into law by a parliamentary vote to remain in effect thereafter. These are the effective dates for the laws. The timescales on which the limits and cuts apply are described above.

6. Plus, one other thing. Why has there been such a strong reaction to these proposed new laws? To play the part of the devil’s adovcate, has the Italian university system not always had its problems? Indeed, was there not a need to improve accountability/reduce nepotism etc, as well as respond to the international financial crisis?

Most of our emphasis is on the situation at the EPRs. I hope I have made clear above that the situation is quite desperate due to 6 years of hiring freezes; we are literally at the point where we find it very difficult to continue with our mission. L133/08 as-is would have destroyed us. Period. DL180 basically takes us back to where we were before L133, which was a critical situation in any case. The effect of L133/08 was electric. It really helped us to energize around demands for

1. Investment in the research sector in line with that in other countries,

2. Greater stautory and economic autonomy for the EPRs (it is absurd to treat them as just branches of the civil service), and

3. A return to a serious, competitive, and sustainable recruitment model to guarantee the future vitality of the EPRs.

I do think in this sense that DDL1441-quater, which is perhaps one of the least important developments in the whole situation, was the straw that broke the camel’s back. L133/08 was passed in August—a good time in Italy to do controversial things. When DDL1441 was introduced, it also forced people to take a close look at L133. As far as reforms to the University system are concerned, that is a much, much more complicated story. I do note the following:

1. L133/08 was an omnibus appropration and administrative reform bill. It did nothing to reform the university system in any way. It only made cuts to the funding and personnel of universities and EPRs. If there are problems (and there are), then by all means they should be fixed. But cuts alone don’t fix anything. In fact, they tend to punish the most productive parts of the system.

2. L133/08 was introduced as DL112 (that’s right—a law-by-decree). How do you tackle a complicated problem like reform of the university system with a law-by-decree? The DL’s are an instrument to bypass parliamentary debate for emergency legislation!

3. DL180 contains some genuine recruitment reforms for university researchers. People of good will might discuss their merits. Unfortunately, DL180 is also a law-by-decree.

I really don’t think any of the students of the Onda ("Wave") are against reforms to increase accountability or reduce nepotism. How could they be? Such reforms would help them most! Instead, they see the above and conclude that the government is mainly issuing decrees which for the most part do nothing other than cut resources. At the same time, there is this prospect of privatization, and the unescapable conclusion is that the goal is to drive the public system into penury so that it must privatize. There is no history for that model of higher education here, so people are justly fearful. As far as the international financial crisis is concerned, allow me to point out that the entire operating allocation for Italian universities (the one that gets cut by 1.5 mld euros from 2009-2012) is 7.5 mld euros. Considering that world governments have spent perhaps 2500 mld euros so far to combat the financial crisis and we have yet to see the effects, I would say that whether or not Italy spends a few hundred million more to shore up its universities and research infrastructure will have zero effect on the short term financial position of the country, but a very large effect on its long-term competitiveness. It is also interesting to note that, according to the OECD, Italy spends just 1.1% of GDP on R&D (including basic, applied, and experimental research in the public, private, and academic sectors). This is to be compared with the EU-27 average of 1.7%. France, Germany, the US, and Japan invest 2.1, 2.5, 2.6, and 3.3% of GDP in R&D, respectively. It is clear that if Italy ever aspires to have a knowledge-based economy, it will have to increase its investments in the research sector. More OECD data is available at our website:

http://www.buconero.eu/en/2008/10/italian-research-oecd/

EPADreamy student days

“TUTTA LA VITA DAVANTI” (“Your Whole Life Ahead”), a recent Italian movie, opens with the voice of a young woman defending her thesis. The camera dwells on one wrinkled visage after another, until it becomes clear that the entire examining board is made up of octogenarians—and a chuckle of cynical recognition runs through the cinema audience.

The retirement age for Italian university teachers is 72. Mariastella Gelmini, education minister in Silvio Berlusconi’s right-wing government, plans to reduce it, though only to 70. And this is just one of a host of reforms she is seeking to make to one of the worst managed, worst performing and most corrupt sectors in Italy. continue

Source: Economist.com